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Adopting a Maori Property Rights
Approach to Fisheries
Valmaine Toki*
For Maori,' tikanga Maori or custom law not only underpinned the
recognition of property rights to their fishery but also their environ-
mental ethics and the sustainable management of that fishery. In
comparison, the property right of non-indigenous peoples was sourced
from a rights system determined by the State. The nature of these
property rights, for Maori, has been acknowledged by legislation.2 The
challenge for Maori is to effectively maintain, develop and manage
this allocated resource in a way that will not only sustain the resource
but also ensure its longevity both socially and economically for future
generations. Among the issues Maori will face are how to balance
effective governance and efficient management, together with the
requirement to address global issues of over-fishing and property rights,
all the while preserving and respecting tradition. Irrespective of these
challenges, it is the tikanga, or philosophy, intrinsic to the traditional
Maori worldview which will guide Maori through these challenges, and
provide a way forward for global issues such as climate change.
1. INTRODUCTION
The lens through which property rights and the rights to fisheries have been
viewed has significantly changed over time. Indigenous property rights to
*BA LLB (Hons), MBA (Tas), LLM. Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand,
Lecturer in Law, University of Auckland. The article was first presented as a paper at the NZCEL
Conference on "Property Rights and Sustainability" held on 16-18 April 2009 at the University
of Auckland.
1 The indigenous people of New Zealand.
2 Refer to Maori Fisheries Act 2004 ("MFA"); Maori Commercial Aquaculture Claims
Settlement Act 2004.
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fisheries are sourced from custom law. Upon colonisation and western inter-
vention, the lens through which these property rights were viewed changed from
one of indigenous property rights to one of common property rights. Coloni-
sation not only subsumed indigenous property rights into western property
rights but also, indigenous management and sustainability ethics were overcome
by the western philosophy of individualisation.
For Maori (indigenous peoples of New Zealand), prior to colonisation, the
property right to fisheries was sourced from Maori custom (tikanga Maori),
Te Ao Maori (Maori worldview) and Maori cosmology.' Post colonisation,
for Maori, the right to fisheries was sourced from concepts such as aboriginal
title4 and the Treaty of Waitangi ("the Treaty").' For Maori, as other indigenous
peoples, the management of fisheries was based on their custom (tikanga Maori)
that required the fish stocks to be held as communal property and managed to
ensure enduring benefit to user groups and their successors.6
For non-indigenous peoples, the perception of fisheries is historically one
of common property and open access (or equal access).7 This common property
perception and common use rights system inevitably led to exploitation and has
been viewed as a hurdle to effective or sustainable management.' The ensuing
debate concerning the ability or inability of common pool resources to be
managed effectively (the "tragedy of the commons" notion) has resulted in
the State playing a commanding role in determining the pattern or allocation of
these rights.10
This article emphasises the changing lens through which property rights and
management of fisheries are viewed. The second part examines the grounds, pre
and post colonisation, upon which Maori claimed their rights to the fishery. This
3 See section 2.2 of this article for further discussion of Te Ao Maori and tikanga Maori.
4 See section 2.2.2 of this article for further discussion of aboriginal title.
5 The Treaty of Waitangi was an agreement signed in 1840 between the Crown and Maori
which guaranteed certain rights to Maori. See section 2.2.1 of this article for further
discussion.
6 Symes, R, "Towards a Property Rights Framework", in R Symes (ed), Property Rights and
Regulatory Systems in Fishing (Blackwell Science, Australia, 1998) 257. However, Arawa
(iwi situated in the Rotorua area) lakes whanau often guarded individual fishery grounds
against other small whanau groups.
7 However, the English/Scottish experience is quite different with commoners having limited
rights to fish on landlords' estates; for discussion on the Black Acts, see E P Thompson,
Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Pantheon, New York, 1975).
8 Symes, supra note 6.
9 Hardin, G, "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 162 Science 1243.
10 See also, Ostrom, Elinor, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). Ostrom proposes
that there are many ways of achieving just and sustainable governance of common-pool
resources beyond the traditional "sterile dichotomy" proposed by Hardin between the
"Leviathan" of state control and neoliberal "Market" solutions.
198
Adopting a Maori Property Rights Approach to Fisheries
culminates in a New Zealand case study that traces the introduction of the Quota
Management System to highlight how these different threads that underpin the
source of property rights for Maori fisheries have ultimately been recognised
in legislation. From this legislative recognition unique considerations, derived
from custom, to sustainably manage this asset will be traversed.
Irrespective of the open access principle and subsequent private property
rights imposed by the State, Maori property rights to their fishery, based on
custom, have been recognised through legislation. Despite the western legis-
lative recognition for these rights, it is evident from the provisions within the
legislation and management of the asset by Maori, that tikanga (custom) still
underlines the property right for Maori.
In comparison, the third part will briefly trace the non-indigenous property
rights to fisheries and problematic global issues that have resulted from common
property rights, asset management and privatisation of resources previously
regulated by States. From these problems associated with non-indigenous
property rights to fisheries, it is suggested that the answers may lie within an
indigenous paradigm.
In conclusion, the article will offer a suggestion of managing marine
resources and associated property rights collectively to ensure longevity of the
industry and a way forward based on tikanga Maori, a return to viewing prop-
erty rights and the rights to fisheries through an indigenous lens.
2. INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHT - MAORI FISHERY
2.1 Background
Various threads underpin Maori rights to fisheries. Prior to colonisation, Maori
cosmology, Te Ao Maori (Maori worldview) and tikanga Maori (Maori custom)
inextricably linked Maori to their fishery. In 1840, the Treaty of Waitangi
recognised these rights in Article 2.
Post colonisation the doctrine of aboriginal title recognises the continuity of
tribal rights, such as the existing Maori rights to fisheries, unless these rights are
extinguished by statute, purchase or voluntary cession." Further, s 88(2) of the
Fisheries Act 1983 (now repealed) explicitly stated: "nothing in this Act shall
affect any Maori fishing rights". Article 2 and the notion of aboriginal title will
be examined in more detail below.
11 McDowell, M and Webb, D, The New Zealand Legal System: Structures and Processes (4th
ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2006) at 195.
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2.2 Te Ao Maori - Tikanga Maori
Maori, like other indigenous peoples, have a spiritual connection to the environ-
ment. 12 Maori perceptions of the environment and natural resources, such as
fisheries and climate, are sourced in Maori cosmology. This cosmology governs
the Maori attitude towards the environment. The separation of Ranginui (sky
father) and Papatuanuku (earth mother) in the creation stories resulted in
the birthing and developing of different ecosystems, such as rains, mists and
dews symbolising the tears of separation of the spouses; and the blood from
the tearing of the sinews joining them became the sunrises and sunsets. This
separation and the ongoing conflict between the children of Rangi and Papa
symbolises the ongoing struggle between different aspects of the environment.13
This was all part of the huge whakapapa (genealogy or lineage) relating
the gods, the natural world and human beings. The whakapapa of each atua,
each god, includes the genealogy of all of those elements within their sphere
of influence. Each element had an assigned role as a result of the separation of
Rangi and Papa. The fulfilment of that role provided the state of balance that is
essential to the Maori worldview. 14
So, as whakapapa relates us as Maori to the environment, in that these
elements are our relations, that concept of whanaungatanga extends to an obli-
gation to our non-human relations also. We are all related and should treat each
other with respect. This is the concept of utu (process to restore balance).
Over time, Maori developed customs to look after the mauri (life force)
of all natural resources and ensure their sustainable management. There is no
concept of ownership of resources, such as the fishery, just control over access
and use. The resource is recognised as taonga (treasure) protected by guardians
(kaitiaki) who mediate the relationships between that resource and people to
maintain the mauri (life force) of that resource. " It is from Te Ao Maori (Maori
worldview) and tikanga Maori (Maori custom) that Maori property rights to
fisheries are established.
These customary tenets are not confined to Maori but are intrinsic to other
12 For general discussion, see also Klein, Ulrich, "Belief-Views on Nature - Western
Environmental Ethics and Maori World Views" (2000) 4 NZJEL 81.
13 For general discussion of these concepts, see Paterson, J, Exploring Maori Values (Thomson
Dunmore Press, Victoria, 2005) at 143-154.
14 See Marsden, M, "The Natural World and Natural Resources", in C Royal (ed), The
Woven Universe: Selected Writings of Rev Maori Marsden (Estate of Rev Maori Marsden,
Masterton, 2003) 24-54.
15 Marsden, ibid, at 54-73.
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indigenous peoples, such as the Saami 6 and First Nations. 7 Nonetheless,
custom law in New Zealand requires incorporation into statute for enforceability.
2.2.1 Treaty of Waitangi
In 1840, when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, Maori owned all the
fisheries." Article 2 of the English textl9 of the Treaty stated:
Her majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs
and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals
thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and
Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or
individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in
their possession ... (emphasis added)
Thus, through Article 2 the Crown guaranteed to Maori the full, exclusive
and undisturbed possession of their fisheries for so long as they desired - a
guarantee of full possession of their fishing resource.
Despite this assurance, the Treaty was initially viewed as a "simple
nullity"20 and the orthodox view, on the legal effect of the Treaty of Waitangi,
is that unless it has been adopted or implemented by statute, it is not part of
our domestic law and creates no rights enforceable in court.21 Matthew Palmer
suggests that "the Treaty is valid and binding on the Crown at international law
and as a matter of honour"; 22 however, it is the "principles of the Treaty" that
are referred to in legislation23 and policy documents24 rather than the text of the
Treaty itself.
16 The indigenous inhabitants of Sdpmi, an area that ranges across what is now Sweden,
Norway, Finland and parts of the Kola Peninsula in Russia. Limited autonomy has been
recognised with the establishment of Saami Parliaments in Finland (1973), Norway (1989)
and Sweden (1993).
17 Referring to the indigenous peoples of the USA and Canada.
18 Walker, R, "The Treaty of Waitangi in the Postcolonial Era", in M Belgrave, M Kawharu
and D Williams (eds), Waitangi Revisited (Oxford University Press, Australia, 2005) 68.
19 There were two versions of the Treaty, one an English text and one a Maori text. It is the
English text/version which is the one most commonly referred to.
20 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZJur (NS) 72, at 78 per Prendergast CJ.
21 See Judge Prendergast's discussion in Wi Parata above; see also Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino
v Aotea District Land Board [1941] NZLR 590 (PC) which supported Prendergast's claim
that the Treaty could have no legal effect unless incorporated in statute.
22 Palmer, M, The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand's Law and Constitution (Victoria
University Press, Wellington, 2008) at 231.
23 For example, Conservation Act 1987, s 4; State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 9.
24 See, for example, the policy of the Office for Disability Issues where the Treaty underpins
the development of their Strategy and is consistent with the relevant principles of the
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The concept of the "principles of the Treaty" was actively constructed
through the interaction and mutual legitimation of the courts,25 the Waitangi
Tribunal,2 6 State agencies and the government. This provides a legal yardstick
by which an issue can be resolved.
2.2.2 Aboriginal title
Common law aboriginal title is concerned with the effect of Crown sovereignty
upon pre-existing property rights of tribal inhabitants.27 When the colonising
power declares itself sovereign over a territory it establishes institutions of
governance including courts that apply English law; that being common law
and statute law.
The source of the common law aboriginal title doctrine is found in European
notions of international law dating back to the sixteenth century.28 Aboriginal
rights are based largely on the presumption of continuity.29 The presumption
applies regardless of whether the new territory was acquired by conquest,
cession or settlement.3 0 Crown ownership of title does not extinguish aboriginal
rights. The doctrine of aboriginal title recognises the legal continuity of tribal
property rights upon the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty over their territory.
Should the Crown wish to extinguish aboriginal title it can do so through
legislation, Crown purchase of title, or voluntary cession by Maori of their
rights.
Cooke P defined aboriginal title in Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc
Society vAttorney-General as:31
On the acquisition of the territory, whether by settlement, cession or
annexation, the colonising power acquires a radical title or underlying title
Treaty; available at <http://www.odi.govt.nz/publications/nzds/discussion-document/tow.
html>.
25 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, at 655, 656 per
Cooke P.
26 An important function of the Waitangi Tribunal was to determine what the "Principles of
the Treaty" were.
27 McHugh, Paul, The Foreshore and Seabed, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, July 2004,
26.
28 Williams, D, "Unique Treaty-Based Relationships Remain Elusive", in Belgrave, Kawharu
& Williams, supra note 18, at 381.
29 Law Commission, Maori Custom and Values in New Zealand Study Paper 9 (Law
Commission, Wellington, March 2001) 11.
30 McNeil, Kent, "Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's the connection?" (1997) 36
Alberta Law Review 193.
31 [1994]2 NZLR 20, at 23-24.
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which goes with sovereignty ... the radical title is subject to the existing native
rights. (emphasis added)
In Re Lundon & Whitaker Claims Act 1871 the Court of Appeal said:3 2
the Crown is bound, both by the common law of England and its own solemn
engagements, to a full recognition of the Native proprietary right. (emphasis
added)
In Canada, the Courts have stated:33
... aboriginal title to land exists in relation to those lands indigenous nations
held exclusively (either de facto or de jure according to their own legal
traditions) at the time when the Crown asserted sovereignty, and where it
continues to exist today it represents a sui generis communal property right
that, although inalienable except to the Crown, permits title holders to use the
land for any purpose that does not destroy their cultural attachment to it ...
(emphasis added)
In terms of substantive content, in Canada, the courts identify aboriginal title
to land, non-title aboriginal rights and treaty rights as three principal strands of
rights that are woven together to provide a constitutional doctrine of aboriginal
rights.34
Aboriginal title can be divided into two categories, territorial and non-
territorial. Territorial title represents what was deemed a tribal claim to "full
ownership of the land"."5 The concept of "full ownership" was not a Maori
concept but one introduced by legislation, in New Zealand, during the 1860s
to convert territorial title to land, or Maori customary land, to freehold titles
and today only small pockets of customary land remain. This represented the
imposition of a "freehold" tenure system by the Crown upon land held by
Maori.3 6 To this end the doctrine of aboriginal title, or native title, is somewhat
32 (1871) 2 NZCA 41, at 49.
33 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [ 1997] 3 SCR 1010.
34 Walters, M, "Promise and Paradox: The Emergence of Indigenous Rights Law in Canada",
in B Richardson, S Imai and K McNeil, Indigenous Peoples and the Law (Oregon, Hart
Publishing, 2009) 37-38.
35 See McHugh, P, "The Legal Basis for Maori Claims against the Crown" (1988) 18 VUWLR
1, at 3.
36 The relevant legislation imposed by the Native Land Court during this period was so
detrimental to Maori custom that it has been coined "the Engine of Destruction" - for
further discussion, see Williams, D, Te Kooti Tango Whenua (Huia Publishing, Wellington,
1999).
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underdeveloped in New Zealand compared to jurisdictions such as Canada and
Australia.
Non-territorial title refers to those rights that may continue to exist in land,
even where the customary title (or territorial title) to land has been extinguished.
These rights are less than absolute ownership, such as the right to cross land,
to fish and to collect flora and fauna. Non-territorial aboriginal rights do not
run with the land and are parasitic to any rights in the territory. Nonetheless, in
both instances, territorial and non-territorial, to establish the existence of that
territorial or non-territorial title or right requires a claim based on custom law.
In the case of Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer,37 the claimant, Te
Weehi, had been harvesting shellfish in an area (shoreline) owned by the Crown.
He appealed conviction by citing s 88(2) of the Fisheries Act which stated that
"nothing in this Act shall affect Maori fishing rights".
The High Court held that although Maori customary title, or territorial title,
to that area (shoreline) had been extinguished it was still burdened by a non-
territorial right, Maori customary fishing. The continuing existence of the right
to gather kaimoana (shellfish) was noted by Williamson J in Te Weehi:
a customary right to take shellfish from the sea along the foreshore need not
necessarily relate to ownership of the foreshore
The non-territorial right was separate to the territorial right.
The doctrine of aboriginal title acknowledges that the Crown is the sole
source of title to land at common law and the Crown's territorial title is subject
to the rights of use and occupancy by the indigenous peoples. These rights
have legal force on the Crown and as a rule of common law can be enforced
irrespective of incorporation within a specific statute.38 These rights claimed by
Te Weehi would thus exist at common law regardless of specific incorporation
in a statute.39
Meyers and Cowan40 view the Te Weehi case as instrumental in empowering
the Maori negotiations with the government on the Maori fisheries claim. This
pressed the New Zealand government towards a serious consideration of Maori
sea fishery rights.4 1
37 [1986] 1 NZLR 690.
38 McDowell & Webb, supra note 11, at 195.
39 Bourassa, S C and Strong, A L, "Restitution of fishing rights to Maori: representation,
social justice and community development" (2000) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 41(2), 155-175,
at 161.
40 Meyers, G D and Cowan, C M, Environmental and natural resources management by the
Maori in New Zealand (Murdoch University, Perth, 1998) 31.
41 McHugh, P, "New Dawn to Cold Light: Courts and Common Law Aboriginal Rights",
in R Bigwood (ed), Public Interest Litigation: New Zealand Experience in International
Perspective (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2006) 47.
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2.3 Legislative Recognition of Indigenous Property Rights
2.3.1 Fisheries Act
Custom law or tikanga Maori is a source of rights that are increasingly
recognised in New Zealand.4 2 These rights were taken into account when
passing early fisheries legislation, with s 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983
explicitly stating that "nothing in this Act shall affect any Maori fishing rights".
In Te Weehi the claimant appealed against the conviction of collecting
shellfish by citing this legislation. This allowed the court to acknowledge
that the claimant's right to fish was based in the doctrine of aboriginal title.
The protection of these fishing rights for Maori within this legislation was of
concern during the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Settlement.4 3
2.3.2 Fisheries AmendmentAct
In the years before 1986 and the introduction of property rights-based
legislation, the New Zealand open access wild capture fishery was managed with
input controls. These input controls or regulations resulted in an overcapitalised
industry with too many fishing boats and unsustainable exploitation.4 4 As a
result, fishers earned low profits and government faced significant cost in
transfer payments and surveillance.
Consequently, management was reformed during the 1980s and 1990s. The
Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 introduced the Quota Management System 45
("QMS"). This created private property rights to catch fish for commercial use
establishing property rights in New Zealand's major commercial fish species.
The introduction of the QMS not only breached the guaranteed property rights,
for Maori, contained in Article 2 of the Treaty and the protections afforded to
Maori in s 88(2) of the Fisheries Act4 6 but also custom law.
Custom law (tikanga Maori) is sourced from tenets such as collectivity,
guardianship, protecting the life force (mauri) of the resource and ensuring the
resource is available within the collective for future generations. The granting
of a private property right in commercial fisheries, through the introduction of
the QMS, vests this right within an individual entity whose interest is primarily
to derive and maintain the greatest economic benefit.
42 McDowell & Webb, supra note 11, at 78.
43 See section 2.3.4 of this article for further discussion.
44 Symes, supra note 6.
45 Refer s 2 and Part IV of the Fisheries Act 1996 for full definition.
46 Durie, M, Nga Tai Matau: Tides ofMaori Endurance (Oxford University Press, Australia,
2005) 114.
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2.3.3 Quota Management System
The QMS is based on the individual transferable quota ("ITQ"), a private
property right to catch a quantity of fish in a specific location during a specific
period of time. 47 This property right can be traded (bought and sold) on the
open market. ITQs are defined as a share of the total allowable commercial
catch ("TACC") and the New Zealand government adjusts this TACC to restrict
the amount of fish landed to sustainable levels. Fishers can contribute to stock
utilisation and sustainability decisions through the various government bodies.
This process inevitably feeds information to the overall sustainability issue
and assists government to set quota and TACC levels. From this information the
annual catch entitlement ("ACE") of a certain tonnage of fish that can be landed
is also set, representing the output from the fishery. The private property right
inherent in the QMS gives the fishers an incentive to care about and participate
in the processes to sustain the resource.
The adoption of the ITQ has been viewed as a step towards securing sus-
tainable fisheries supported by legislation and administrative machinery.48 The
respective fisheries legislation appears to be directed towards creating a property
right.4 9 It is arguable that the inefficient management practices and perhaps the
desire to obtain a tradeable and economically based "property right" within the
fishery resource prompted the introduction of the Quota Management System.
2.3.4 Settlement process
Unlike the Treaty of Waitangi for Maori, in Canada, a treaty enjoys the consti-
tutional protection of s 35 of the Constitution Act 1982. If introducing a private
property right in a resource eliminates these constitutionally protected rights,
there is no recourse to a judicial challenge in order to realise the abrogation
of these rights on the grounds that this is contrary to the Constitution as
47 For general discussion on the QMS, see also Wallace, Cath, "Environmental Justice and
New Zealand's Fisheries Quota Management System" (1999) 3 NZJEL 33.
48 See Scott, A, "Development of Property in the Fishery" (1988) Marine Resource
Economics 5, 289-331. See also Connor, R, "Are ITQs Property Rights? Definition,
Discipline and Discourse", in Ross Shotton (ed), Use of Property Rights in Fisheries
Management: Proceedings of the FishRights 99 Conference Fremantle, Western Australia,
11-19 November 1999 Workshop presentations, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/2,
available at <http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/X8985E/x8985e04.htm#WHAT%20ARE%20
PTOPERTY%20RIGHTS%20Chairman%20Peter%20Millington,%20Fisheries%20
Western%20Australia,%20Perth> (last accessed 4 August 2010).
49 Refer New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen (Inc) v Minister of Fisheries CP
294/96 and on appeal as CA 82/97, CA 83/97, CA 96/97 where both the High Court and
Court of Appeal declared quota as property only subject to the overriding powers of the
legislature.
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these rights enjoy constitutional protection afforded by the Constitution Act
1982. Section 35 also offers constitutional protection to aboriginal rights and
impending legislation cannot interfere with them. Treaty rights together with
aboriginal title and non-title aboriginal rights provide a constitutional doctrine
of aboriginal rights; and as constitutional rights, in Canada, they are protected
from governmental and legislative interference. 0
In New Zealand, however, the same level of protection and recognition is not
afforded. Neither the text of the Treaty (of Waitangi) nor tikanga Maori (custom
law) has been incorporated into domestic legislation. Domestic legislation is
binding on the State. Irrespectively, Maori appealed to the Waitangi Tribunal"
and courts for recourse on the breach of these rights. In 1988 and again in 1992
the Waitangi Tribunal produced two major fisheries reports: the Muriwhenua
and Ngai Tahu reports. These reports recognised that customary Maori fishing
rights had a commercial component and that such rights were capable of
evolving as recognised commercial rights in fishing.5 2
This right to development was recognised not only by the Waitangi Tribunal
but again by the High Court and Court of Appeal.53 It was accepted that as a
result of the Quota Management System, Maori had either lost their rights or
were stopped from developing them as they were entitled.
The Waitangi Tribunal and courts also established that Maori fishing
rights were held and exercised as a consequence of tikanga Maori, whakapapa
(genealogy) relationships, and that whanau (family and extended family
group) and individuals benefited from fishing rights and those whakapapa
relationships.5 4
The Waitangi Tribunal, High Court and Court of Appeal recognised that
the introduction of the QMS impinged upon the right of Maori to develop
this resource. The Waitangi Tribunal, High Court and Court of Appeal also
recognised that the basis for this claim, to the fishery, was one sourced in
tikanga Maori (custom law). The threads that underpin this right are based
on custom, and the management of this right is also one based on custom.
50 Walters, M, "The Emergence of Indigenous Rights Law in Canada", in Richardson, Imai &
McNeil, supra note 34, at 38.
51 The Waitangi Tribunal was established under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 as a forum to
hear disputes between Maori and the Crown and make recommendations.
52 McDowell & Webb, supra note 11, at 204.
53 Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board & Ors v Director General of Conservation & Ors CA 18/95,
22 September 1995, Cooke P, Richardson, Casey, Hardie Boys, Gault JJ. See also Waitangi
Tribunal, Muriwhenua Fishing Claim Report (1988) 234-235.
54 Findings on the nature and extent of fisheries rights have been made by the Waitangi
Tribunal (Muriwhenua Fishing, Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries and Fisheries Settlement reports)
and the Courts (Te Waka Hi 1ka o Te Arawa v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission
[2000] 1 NZLR 285, at 307-312 per High Court and 375-376 per Court of Appeal).
55 Ibid.
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Irrespectively, the resultant settlement from this appeal, to the Waitangi Tribunal
and courts, was ultimately a private property right for Maori in the form of
quota and shares.
In legal proceedings Maori obtained from the High Court and the Court of
Appeal,5 6 by way of interim relief, a declaration that the Crown ought not to
take further steps to bring fisheries within the Quota Management System. This
prompted the Crown to negotiate with Maori on Treaty fishing rights. These
negotiations led to a two-stage settlement of claims over Maori commercial and
customary fisheries.
The first step was an interim arrangement effected by the Maori Fisheries
Act 1989 which was enacted to allow better provision for the recognition of
Maori commercial fishing rights secured by the Treaty. This Act provided to
the Maori Fisheries Commission, established pursuant to the Maori Fisheries
Act 1989, a proportion of quota holdings or the equivalent value in cash as
compensation for commercial fishing claims. The Maori Fisheries Commission
was to also promote Maori involvement in the business and activity of fishing.
A Deed of Settlement, dated 23 September 1992, was entered into between
the Crown and Maori, effectively settling the commercial fishing claims by
Maori. Subsequently the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act
was enacted to give effect to the settlement of claims relating to Maori fishing
rights provided for in the Deed of Settlement. This included:
(a) the reconstitution of the Maori Fisheries Commission as the Treaty of
Waitangi Fisheries Commission ("the Commission");
(b) payment of cash to the Commission (which was to be used to purchase a
50 per cent shareholding of Sealord Products Limited);
(c) provision for the allocation of 20 per cent of quota for any new species
brought into the Quota Management System;
(d) provision for the making of regulations to recognise and provide for
customary food gathering by Maori; and
(e) empowerment of the Commission to hold the assets and develop a model
to allocate the assets to Maori.
In return Maori agreed:
(a) that the Settlement settled all Maori commercial fishing rights and
interests;
(b) to accept regulations for customary fishing, and to stop litigation relating
to Maori commercial fisheries;
56 Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc vAttorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 641.
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(c) to support legislation to give effect to the Settlement; and
(d) to endorse the Quota Management System.
Despite the legal recognition that Maori owned all the fisheries, in a mag-
nanimous gesture Maori gifted half the fishery back to the Crown.5 7
Subsequent to the development of a model to allocate these fishery assets
to Maori, the Maori Fisheries Act 2004 ("MFA") was passed to codify the
allocation model and enable Te Ohu Kaimoana (the statutory organisation
dedicated to future advancement of Maori interests in the marine environment
which was established under the Act) to transfer fisheries assets to Maori.
The settlement asset resultant from this process included for each iwi quota
shares (both inshore and deepwater) in Aotearoa Fisheries Limited ("AFL"), 5
a Maori-owned company, and cash. AFL, pursuant to the MFA, has a 50 per
cent shareholding in Sealord (Nelson) and Prepared Foods Ltd (Palmerston
North); and 100 per cent ownership of Moana Pacific Fisheries (Auckland),
Chatham Processing (Chatham Islands), Pacific Marine Farms (Coromandel)
and Prepared Foods Processing (Palmerston North).
The right to development recognised by the Waitangi Tribunal and again
by the courts5 9 provided a process to establish private property rights for
Maori both in terms of quota shares and shares in Aotearoa Fisheries Limited.
Although this right to development has ultimately been manifested in a private
property right for Maori, the thread that underpins this right is one based on
custom and the management of this right is one based on custom.
2.4 Sustainable Management of the Fishery
Bearing in mind that tikanga (custom) was the basis upon which the property
right to the fishery was established,60 there are unique considerations that iwi
(tribes) are required to address in the sustainable management of this asset,
including future and cultural considerations.
57 Walker, supra note 18.
58 Aotearoa Fisheries Limited was established pursuant to s 60 of the MFA and is required
to manage its assets in a commercial manner (s 61). See Subpart 3 of the MFA for full
provisions pertaining to AFL.
59 Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board & Ors v Director General of Conservation & Ors CA 18/95,
22 September 1995, Cooke P, Richardson, Casey, Hardie Boys, Gault JJ. See also Waitangi
Tribunal, Muriwhenua Fishing Claim Report (1988) 234-235.
60 Ibid.
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2.4.1 Future considerations
Due to the cultural dynamic, Maori organisations are often established to
provide a resource for future generations (taonga tuku iho), so the long-term
vision for that organisation and strategies to ensure its continuing success are
critical. The tikanga principle of taonga tuku iho is similar to the social equity
principle of intergenerational justice or justice for future generations. These
two terms reflect the broad acceptance that justice spans past, present and the
future. 61
For Maori organisations this principle has implications for many aspects
of governance such as selecting board members with a view to handing the
business on, and in strategic planning where a 25-year view, or longer, may
be taken. This may seem similar to organisations in industries such as farming
or aquaculture, which also undertake long-term planning, but for many Maori
organisations the time span is intergenerational.
Conversely, some stakeholders, such as financiers, may adopt a short-term
view - for example, focusing on immediate and short-term returns or limiting
to a five-year planning cycle. Good communication with stakeholders and
potential financiers concerning the strategic plan is therefore vital to ensure
that any long-term view to sustain and develop the settlement asset is fully
appreciated.
It is acknowledged that adopting a strategic long-term view can not only
lock organisations into unproductive deals but can also prevent acceptance of
opportunities that may arise in the interim. Effective strategic management
plans are essential and the inclusion of exit strategies assist to compensate any
effects of adverse deals or alternatively permit the organisation to engage new
opportunities as they occur.
2.4.2 Cultural considerations
Many Maori organisations are explicitly driven by tikanga (culture), kawa
(protocol) and values (for example in employment, tangihanga or funeral rites,
and cultural leave policies) that take into account the aspirations of whanau
(extended family), hapu (subtribe) and iwi (tribe).62 Cultural considerations will
sometimes take precedence over purely economic factors. For instance, many
coastal iwi will adopt a provision to enable iwi Maori to fish quota. In many
61 Bosselman, K and Grinlinton, D (eds), Environmental Law for a Sustainable Society (New
Zealand Centre for Environmental Law, Auckland, 2002).
62 See Effective Governance, available at <http://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/services/effective/> (last
accessed 5 August 2010). See also Law Commission Report, Waka Umanga: A proposed
law for Maori Governance Entities, May 2006, Report 92, Wellington, New Zealand.
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instances this quota package could be leased for a greater commercial value;
however, the cultural or tikanga value will override the commercial gain.
Maori organisations may also have a Maori dimension in procedure such
as the use of Te Reo (Maori language), mihi (greeting), karakia (prayer),
koha (donation), hospitality for manuhiri (visitors), manaakitanga (care for),
whanaungatanga (relationship), kotahitanga (unity, consensus decision-making)
and regular consultation hui (meetings or gatherings). These elements should
support the general principles of good governance. Subsequently, it is important
to have people with expertise in tikanga and kawa on the board.
In recognising the need for Maori to form their own structure based on their
specific kawa and protocol, the Waka Umanga (Maori Incorporations) Bill63 was
introduced. The primary objective of this Bill is to provide a balance between
good corporate governance standards to ensure governors act in accordance
with the interests of current and future members, and the need to maintain scope
for tribes to develop structures appropriate to their size, structure and cultural
traditions. Although not introduced specifically for the Fisheries Settlement,
but to address the inadequacies of existing legislation, it belatedly provides an
appropriate vehicle for Maori in terms of maintaining their cultural structures.
It is acknowledged that non-indigenous business practices may also conform
to these unique considerations. However, each iwi (tribe) upon receipt of their
assets is different, and it is imperative that the appropriate governance structure,
with an accompanying strategic management plan, is adopted to safeguard the
assets and provide a clear path for Maori. Upon establishment of this structure
the strategic plans can then realise the respective kawa (protocol), kaupapa (way
of doing things) and agenda for each iwi.
The inclusion of these unique cultural considerations complicates the
issue of governance for Maori entities, particularly when the inclusion of these
principles is implemented alongside general governance principles.
2.4.3 Legislative considerations
The purpose of the Maori Fisheries Act 200464 is to implement the agreements
made in the Deed of Settlement, outlined above, and provide for the develop-
ment of the collective and individual interests of Maori in fisheries by establish-
ing a framework to allocate and manage the settlement assets.
It is acknowledged that part of the settlement was to implement regulations
63 See also general discussion on the provisions, Te Puni Kokiri, "Waka Umanga Bill - Key
Provisions", available at <http://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/consultation/reform/wakaumanga>
(last accessed 5 August 2010).
64 MFA, s 3.
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to recognise and provide for customary fishing 65 and food gathering 66 for Maori.
The recognition of custom (tikanga), within this framework, is clear. This was
effected through fisheries regulations within the Fisheries Act 1986. The Maori
Fisheries Act 2004, in essence, directs the allocation of financial assets. This
analysis addresses the recognition of custom within a commercial property
rights framework.
Tikanga (custom) principles are recognised in the Maori Fisheries Act
2004. Consistent with tikanga principle taonga tuku iho (held in trust for
future generations) the MFA contains provisions that restrict the passing of the
settlement asset outside iwi.67 The management structure also provides for two
entities: a traditional structure68 and a commercial structure. 69 Schedule 7 of the
MFA refers to "kaupapa" (way of doing things) that is required to establish the
"traditional structure". The traditional structure accommodates tikanga prac-
tices whereas the commercial structure is an economically driven entity that has
reporting responsibilities to the traditional structure. This arrangement enables
Maori to maintain their traditional governance while at the same time having the
agility to act as a business entity.
2.5 Conclusion: Indigenous Property Right - Fishery
An indigenous property right to fish is sourced, pre colonisation, from custom
law. Post-colonisation western concepts such as aboriginal title, treaty rights and
statute provided for recognition of these rights. Nonetheless, the underpinning
issue or concept to be satisfied, pre or post colonisation, is one of customary
law (tikanga Maori).
In comparison, a non-indigenous property right to fish, or the western
notion of property rights and fisheries resources, is based on the presumption
that the resource is an asset that can be owned, divided and transferred. Linked
to this presupposition is the idea of the State being the owner of the asset on
behalf of the public, a right determined and regulated by the State.
Maori have a different interpretation of the relationship between people and
the fisheries resource. Maori do not, and cannot, own the fisheries resource.
Rather, Maori are the guardian of that resource for future generations. This
65 See, for example, Fisheries (South Island Customary Fishing) Regulations 1999 -
provisions for Maori to fish for non-commercial purposes.
66 See Part IX of the Fisheries Act 1996 for customary fishing management tools.
67 Section 161 of the MFA provides that settlement quota cannot be gifted and restricts the
sale of settlement quota to other recognised iwi or an entity within Te Ohu Kaimoana.
68 Section 14 of the MFA and Schedule 7 contains criteria and kaupapa for a Mandated Iwi
Organisation.
69 Section 16 of the MFA contains criteria for the Asset Holding Company including that they
are wholly owned by, and provide dividends to, the Mandated Iwi Organisation.
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authority is confirmed by genealogy, defined by physical boundaries, and
determines seasons, methods and any other measure to sustainably manage the
fishery. The access to the fishery that Maori had exercised over generations was
one of responsibility to ensure longevity and sustainability of that resource.
For Maori, the right to the fishery has been recognised by legislation. 70
This underpinning right is one based on tikanga. Tikanga does not stop at the
recognition of guardianship but extends to effective governance and sustainable
management to ensure longevity of the resource for future generations. Despite
the commercial recognition of private property rights for Maori, the tangible
recognition of tikanga is reflected in the iwi governance structures underpinned
by parallel recognition of tikanga in the provisions of the Maori Fisheries Act
2004.
3. NON-INDIGENOUS PROPERTY RIGHTS - FISHERY
3.1 Background
In comparison to the indigenous perspective, the lens through which non-
indigenous peoples view fisheries is one of open access. At common law
there are recognised public rights of navigation and fishery. According to
Viscount Haldane in Attorney-General (British Columbia) v Attorney-General
(Canada) :71
The subjects of the Crown are entitled as of right ... to fish in the high seas. It
is probably a right enjoyed so far as the High Seas are concerned by common
practice from time immemorial ... (emphasis added)
Any grants made by the Crown to land adjoining the shoreline were subject
to the public right to fish. This common law right could only be overturned by
statute. Parliament or the State may regulate fishing and grant private property
rights in any manner it sees fit.72
70 See, for example, MFA and Maori Commercial Aquaculture Claims Settlement Act 2004.
71 [1914] AC 153, at 169.
72 Boast, R, Foreshore and Seabed (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at 42.
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3.1.1 Property rights
Spiller defines "property" as a "thing owned, that over which title is exercised,
whether tangible or intangible, real or personal"73 and a "right" as "a lawful title
or claim to anything".74
Bearing in mind these definitions, scholars in various disciplines such as
economics and the social sciences have developed theories to determine the
term "property rights". Economists 75 provide a quantified view of property,
and the rights intrinsic to this view of property contain four characteristics:
exclusivity, duration, security and transferability. It is acknowledged that
these characteristics are far from absolute, but it is this economic view that
often prevails in providing the more appropriate theory for property rights for
fisheries and ultimately legislative rights to them.
3.1.2 Property rights in fisheries
The resolution of problems associated with property rights is fundamental for
the effective management of marine resources. Predictably, there has been a
considerable amount of literature and debate that has ensued as to the meaning
and nature of fisheries property rights systems. So, it is not surprising that the
issue of property rights occupies a position of central importance in the social
science of fisheries management.
With respect to fisheries rights there are four basic property rights regimes:
open access, state property, private property and common property.76 These
rights have been expanded to include a global regime and a communal regime.
It is within these regimes that fishers exercise generic rights such as the right of
harvest, use, conservation and management.
3.1.3 Property rights and use rights
Although the basic economic problem of commercial fisheries can be viewed
as the absence of property rights to the fish stocks, 7 7 the preferable arrangement
appears to be stock control by public agencies, combined with exclusive
use rights granted, leased or sold to the fishing industry in order to achieve
73 Spiller, P, Butterworths New Zealand Law Dictionary (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington,
2005) at 242.
74 Ibid, at 270.
75 FAO Depository Office of Director General, Legislating for Property Rights, available at
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5672e/y5672e04.htm> (last accessed 4 August 2010).
76 Ibid.
77 Hannesson, R6gnvaldur, "Rights Based Fishing: Use Rights versus Property Rights to Fish"
(2005) Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 15(3) 231-241.
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economic efficiency. Incentives to establish such rights can be found both in
government circles and in the industry.
Use rights that attract a user fee are often utilised as a tool for government
agencies to achieve economic efficiency in the industry. Norway and Iceland are
two countries that have put in place use rights, but they have done so in different
ways. Iceland, like New Zealand, has an Individual Transfer Quota system while
Norway has fishing concessions combined with individual vessel quotas. Some
success appears to have been achieved in both countries with these systems.
In comparison to New Zealand's situation, the property rights concept
implemented in Australian legislation ranges between an endorsed licence
model and one approaching, but not actually attaining, a full property rights
concept. Although some Australian states provide legislative penalties and
cancellation of licences, 78 few have developed the concept of fisheries quotas to
the stage of creating a property right.79 It could be concluded that the Australian
system is hindering or not supporting the need to secure a sustainable fishery.
However, fisheries are complex and interdependent ecological and social
systems that require integrated management approaches. 0 The actions of
one person or group of users affect the availability of the resource for others.
Managing such common pool resources requires conscious efforts by a broad
range of stakeholders to organise and craft rules enabling equitable and
sustainable use of the resources for everyone's benefit. Collective action is often
a prerequisite for the development of community-based institutions and the
devolution of authority.
Elinor Ostrom's theory of common pool resource" existing in the interstices
of the Market and the State, notes that:8 2
Many alternative forms of property have repeatedly been found to work
effectively when well matched to the attributes of the resource and the
harvesters themselves, and when the resulting rules are enforced, considered
legitimate, and generate long-term patterns of reciprocity ... in spite of Hardin's
78 See, for example, Victoria's Fisheries Act which provides for cancellation of entitlement
to quota and suspension of licence. Also the Commonwealth's Fisheries Management Act
1991 which provides for the suspension or cancellation of fishing concessions.
79 The most developed is the NSW Fisheries Management Act 1994 which employs the
approach of allocating "shares" in a "share management fishery". Whereas the least
developed are Victoria and Queensland. Victoria establishes "individual quota units" within
the total allowable catch.
80 Mahfuzuddin, Ahmed, Viswanathan, K Kuperan, Valmonte-Santos, R A, "Collective Action
and Property Rights in Fisheries Management", available at <http://ideas.repec.org/p/
fpr/2020br/1 107.html> (last accessed 5 October 2010).
81 Ostrom, supra note 10.
82 Van Laerhoven, Frank, and Ostrom, Elinor, "Traditions and Trends in the Study of the
Commons" (2007) 1 International Journal of the Commons 3, at 19.
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persistent metaphor, today many people, ranging from policy makers, donors,
practitioners, and citizen activists, to scientists from different disciplines, have
begun to appreciate that there is a world of nuances between the State and the
Market.
3.1.4 Shared fisheries in New Zealand
Bearing in mind the aim that all New Zealanders have the basic right to catch
fish and that shared fisheries should be managed in such a way that produces the
best value for New Zealand, in 2007 the Ministry of Fisheries released a Shared
Fisheries paper to provide opportunities for New Zealanders to obtain the best
value from the use of fisheries resources.
This paper identified that effective management is currently undermined
by poor information on amateur catch and uncertainty surrounding the
process for allocating the available catch between commercial, customary
and amateur fishers." In addition, the paper also identifies the risks associated
with management decisions based on poor information, the cost of ongoing
contention and litigation, and the loss of value associated with inadequate
incentives for all sectors to protect and improve shared fisheries.
Although this initiative has stalled, it indicated the willingness of the New
Zealand government to maintain sustainability of the fishery economically,
socially and culturally for all New Zealanders and consider their respective
rights. It is acknowledged that there have been no property rights allocated to
endorse this basic right to catch fish.84
3.1.5 Property rights for indigenous peoples in other jurisdictions
Most writers, managers, economists and policy makers agree that the granting
of property rights in fisheries to the private sector will result in increased
involvement in maintaining the resource." However, social scientists dispute
this assumption, seeing the argument for increased property rights in fisheries
as an economic rationalisation working against disadvantaged groups such as
indigenous peoples.
Unlike Maori, this position for the indigenous peoples of Australia is further
compounded by the fact that the current Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) does not
recognise the full extent of the property rights that they are due. Although the
83 Ministry of Fisheries, Introduction to the Shared Fisheries Proposals, available at <http://
www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/info/aboutus/Organisation/policy/Shared+Fisheries/intro.htm> (last
accessed 8 May 2009).
84 Ibid.
85 Shotton, supra note 48.
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Native Title Act refers to native title over land and waters (including seas) and
specifically refers to "fishing rights" in s 223(1), the Commonwealth argues
that only native title recognised by common law was protected by the Native
Title Act.86 Bearing in mind that the majority of Australian states have not yet
developed the concept of property rights for fisheries, the stance taken by the
Australian courts in granting (or not granting) property rights in fisheries for
indigenous peoples is perhaps justified.
In Norway, the recently produced clarifications from the Saami Rights
Commission and the Coastal Fishing Commission have clearly placed the
question of Saami rights to marine resources on the agenda. One recommen-
dation of the Saami Rights Commission is that special fjord-related rights be
legalised.
This proposal for legislative recognition of fishing rights for Saami indig-
enous peoples is similar to the situation for Maori. 7 The right stems from local
Saami custom and practice that in turn is based upon customary knowledge,
ecological knowledge and customary sustainable management of this resource.
Whilst the legislative recognition of fishery rights for the Saami peoples is
still in the formative stages, arguably the decrease of local cod stocks and
comprehensive ecological changes have contributed to the policy direction
of government towards a favourable view of the ability of indigenous Saami
peoples to sustainably manage their fishery.
3.1.6 Property rights - conclusion
Compared to conservation measures used in other countries, the introduction of
the QMS in New Zealand has been relatively positive as it established tradeable
property rights that allowed fishers to enter or exit the industry. Property rights
determined who was able to participate in the fishery and this resulted in
significant changes for boat owners, crew and related processing industries
and on coastal communities. Attempts to introduce ITQs overseas have led
to concerns over the concentration of quota into fewer fishing operations and
the negative effect this can have on coastal communities." It is apparent that
property rights need to be clearly defined in order to avoid tension over access
to the fishery.
86 Commonwealth v Yarrmir (2001) 208 CLR 1, 184 ALR 113 (HC Australia).
87 Although for the Saami peoples the Commission also refers to international law which
grants these fisheries protection against measures that may endanger that right to continued
cultural enjoyment and that this protection has not ceased even if the fishing currently takes
place with more modern equipment. Also Art 27 ICCPR, Art 15 ILO Convention 169 where
the State is obligated to implement consultation and Saami participation in any decision-
making that may impact on possibilities to perform Coastal Saami fishing.
88 Symes, supra note 6.
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Stakeholders with an interest in fisheries resources but who are not part of
the QMS include Maori with customary fishing rights, landowners with coastal
riparian rights and quota holders. Whilst property rights help provide for the
commercial certainty required for the long-term investment in aquaculture and
sustainable management of the wild catch fishery, a co-operative management
plan to include a social dynamic is still required to ensure the longevity of the
industry and maintain the value of the property right.
However, any system must be prepared to change and develop as the
needs of the people evolve. For instance, as measures established to protect
threatened species gradually prove successful, some stringent controls may be
relaxed. Alternatively, more controls may be required to protect the rights of
indigenous peoples. It is important to understand the nature of the right and the
consequences involved in the protection of that right.
3.2 Global Problems
3.2.1 Over-fishing
Much of the rationale behind the open access principle" was predicated on a
supposedly inexhaustible supply of marine resources. However, the problems
of over-fishing in an open access regime were already becoming apparent. In
a recent analysis of the state of the world's fish stocks, the Food Agricultural
Organisation ("FAO") noted that:9 0
(a) 25 per cent are over-fished;
(b) 52 per cent are fully utilised, but not over-fished; and that
(c) Only 23 per cent of the stocks could produce more.
The FAO believe that there is limited room for expanding capture fisheries
further and consider that gains will have to come from better management of
the resources; projecting that aquaculture production might be up by some 50
per cent from current levels by 2015.
Nonetheless, the core problem facing fisheries is the social and economic
inefficiencies of the management regime, not over-fishing.9' Inevitably this
requires co-operation between the fisher and the management to develop
policies and regulations to ensure social, economic and cultural sustainability
of the resource.
89 Open access principle and freedom of the seas were developed from the writings of Grotius
in the 16th and 17th century.
90 Presentation by Grimur Valdimarrson, Director, FAO, "Aligning incentives for responsible
fisheries: an FAO perspective", NZ Seafood Industry Conference, 24-25 May 2006.
91 Ibid.
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3.2.2 Future challenges
It is perhaps imprudent to predict the future, but the changing nature of fisheries
science cannot be ignored. Bio-economic analyses are increasingly important
in the assessment and management of fisheries and there is more concern than
ever before about the impacts of fishing on the marine environment. 92 This is
reflected in the work now performed by laboratories that are concerned with the
impacts of fishing on habitats and ecosystem processes, 93 and this may provide
the basis for setting management strategies such as limits to the frequency and
intensity of trawling.
The burden of proof for showing that fishing does not have adverse environ-
mental effects is likely to shift toward the fisher and it is expected that there will
be more research on precautionary approaches to dealing with uncertainty. So,
in the short term it is not unreasonable to assume that there will be increasing
pressure on the fisheries and the correlative effect on the ecosystem.
Sustainability is a key goal in fisheries. In a new FAO report it was stated
that the fishing industry and national fisheries authorities must do more to
understand and prepare for the impact climate change will have on world
fisheries.94
The concern from conservation and pressure groups to alleviate the situation
of over-fishing and now the effect of climate could lead to a structural change
in fisheries.95 Once again the ownership of fishing rights, property rights and
fish stocks is likely to become the norm with fishers becoming more actively
involved in management decisions. Participation in these management decisions




Whilst countries like New Zealand and Australia have introduced fisheries
legislation recognising property rights in their fisheries, the debate continues
on the appropriate fisheries management regime. From the outset New Zealand
92 Jennings, Simon, Kaiser, Michel J and Reynolds, John D (eds), Marine Fisheries Ecology
(Blackwell Science, Oxford, 2005).
93 Jennings et al, ibid.
94 FAO, The State of World Fisheries andAquaculture, available at <http://www.fao.org/news/
story/en/item/10270/icode/> (last accessed 5 August 2010).
95 Jennings et al, supra note 92.
219
New Zealand Journal ofEnvironmental Law
has embraced the notion of sustainable fisheries and engaged with Maori to
settle their Treaty claims to their fishery.
From a global fishery perspective, it is difficult not to applaud the success
of the QMS that not only establishes a property right but also provides a
vehicle to protect this right and enable effective participation by industry on
issues affecting the fishery. Although property rights may be a step towards
sustainability of the resource, this view is not without its problems.
With pressures on the global ecosystem including climate change and
concerns from conservation groups it is no surprise that there is support for
changing the existing management regime. Over-fishing is merely a symptom
of the management problem.
Increased property rights as an economic rationalisation works against
the interest of disadvantaged groups or new entrants who are unable to secure
these rights, favouring instead the groups with deeper pockets. Nonetheless,
these social obligations can be satisfied by group quota schemes. Inevitably this
requires co-operation between all groups to develop policies and regulations to
ensure social, economic and cultural sustainability of the resource.
Maori collectively now exert an influence on approximately 40 per cent by
volume of all quota. Furthermore, it can be concluded that Maori collectively
share in excess of 700 million NZD in fisheries assets (as valued at April 2003).
Although it may be belated, the Waka Umanga (Maori Incorporations) Bill
provides an effective vehicle for Maori to form their own tribal structures that
best suit their own culture, traditions and particular requirements. These include
the adoption of relevant core tikanga (cultural) principles such as taonga tuku
iho (a treasure for future generations), manaakitanga (caring for each other) and
kotahitanga (working as one).
Maori are undeniably a major player in New Zealand and global fisheries.
To effectively address the issue of property rights requires co-operation between
all groups. Furthermore, for any system to be effective it must be prepared to
change and develop as the needs of the people evolve. As such it is important
to understand the nature of the right and the consequences involved in the
protection of that right.
4.2 A Way Forward?
The philosophy underpinning Maori tikanga includes concepts such as taonga
tuku iho (future generations), kaitiakitanga (guardianship), manaakitanga (a
duty to look after others) and kotahitanga (unity). The aim of tikanga Maori
is balance. The interaction of these concepts to preserve intergenerational
and intragenerational equity is consistent with the concept of "sustainable
management". It is suggested that this underlying philosophy extends not
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only to the management of the fishery but also to the respective governance
structures.
With respect to the strong economic position Maori hold in fisheries
together with the ability to utilise an appropriate governance structure and the
underlying tikanga principles of taonga tuku iho, manaakitanga and kotahitanga,
Maori need to take a lead in global fishery management. It is suggested that
these principles can be applied to assist in the future management of the fishery
with the realisation of longevity and economic, social and cultural sustainability
of the industry.

